Rapid Acquisition Authority After Change 1

Faster to start, no easier to award

Section 229 of the FY2024 NDAA lets a Military Department Secretary determine that development on an emergent technology or emerging threat should begin before the budget catches up. Change 1 writes that route into the manual. It does not mention that the route is capped at $100 million a year across the Department, restricted to procurement or RDT&E funds available to the Service that fiscal year, and barred from waiving the competition requirements in Chapter 221 of Title 10.

Rapid acquisition authority decides who may redirect money and how quickly. It does not produce a contract or a funding source. A company that raises it with a customer without an award route, a transition plan and an assessment package hands the sponsor a problem instead of a path.

What the paper answers

• Who can now initiate rapid acquisition work, and who still has to approve it?
• Which RAA ceilings apply today, and why is the rapid prototyping start now $50 million Department-wide rather than $200 million?
• What can the waiver reach after Change 1, and what can never be waived?
• How do the five-day funding search and Comptroller validation change a request?
• Which two transition clocks govern a Section 229 effort, and how do they differ?
• Can RAA be used under the FY2027 continuing resolution, and on what conditions?
• When might combatant command experimentation authority under Section 873 fit better than RAA?

What's inside

• A side-by-side table comparing the 2019 edition with Change 1 across seventeen topics, from statutory basis to the low-rate initial production limit.
• Seven analytical sections: the Section 229 route, the ceilings, waiver scope, funding, reporting and notification, test and assessment, and transition.
• Implications for program offices and requirement sponsors, and separately for companies, including firms that integrate, test and sustain rather than own the product.
• Four author's notes drawn from a career in Navy acquisition on the frozen middle, why a program of record rarely changes horses midstream, the advocate an urgent need requires, and how little latitude programs have to move money.
• Eight UDC recommendations and 14 references to the manual, the statute, the appropriations acts and GAO reporting.

The statutory limits Change 1 leaves out

The paper reads the manual against 10 U.S.C. 3601 and its statutory notes, and states each limit the manual does not repeat:

• The $100 million annual Department-wide cap on Section 229 development
• The restriction of Section 229 to procurement or RDT&E funds available to the Service that fiscal year
• The bar on waiving Chapter 221 of Title 10, which holds the competition requirements
• The 15-day congressional notice after the Secretary of War approves a Section 229 determination

Who it's for

• Companies with new technology that a Service could start under Section 229 in the year of need.
• Capture and business development leads who still brief RAA from the 2019 manual.
• Firms whose strength is integration, test, human systems integration or sustainment on accelerated efforts.
• Program office and requirement sponsor staff preparing an RAA request or a Section 229 determination.

About the author

Chris A. Grable is founder and CEO of Up Doppler Consulting LLC, a Veteran-Owned Small Business in Leonardtown, Maryland. A Navy veteran with more than 45 years in DOW operations and acquisition, he retired from federal service as Senior Experiment Designer at the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division. UDC helps technology companies find, shape and win DOW work.